

## **UQ ACPCS Seminar (22 October 2008)**

# **WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN FIFTH-CENTURY ATHENS**

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### **SLIDE 1: TITLE PAGE**

## **INTRODUCTION**

**SLIDE 2: THE PARTHENON** Classical Athens is famous for creating what is arguably the world's first democracy and for its related cultural revolution that laid the foundations for the historiography, theatre, philosophy and visual arts of the antique and modern worlds.<sup>1</sup> Little known (and certainly never hymned) is the city's contemporaneous military revolution. Athens of the fifth century intensified and transformed the waging of war, killed tens of thousands of fellow Greeks, and ignored some of the traditional customs of battle. By the time its democracy was fully elaborated, in the 450s, war had come to dominate the politics and popular culture of the city and the lives of its citizens.<sup>2</sup> War consumed more money than any other public activity, was waged more frequently than ever before, and was the main topic of debate in the democratic council and assembly.<sup>3</sup> Certainly this military revolution was made possible by the unrivalled size of Attike and its citizen population and the unprecedented supply of money from the Athenian maritime empire. However, the practical innovations Athens made to the waging of war, the efficiency of its military operations, and the disturbing willingness of its non-elite citizens to fight and die in battle were direct consequences of the new practices of the democracy. To a large extent the twin revolutions of Athenian culture and warfare can be understood as flip sides of each other.

This seminar has three parts. Part I considers warfare in sixth-century Athens in order to set a benchmark for measuring changes to come. Part II analyzes the innovations and limits of the Athenian military revolution. Part III sketches how democracy itself was partially responsible for Athenian bellicosity.

### **SLIDE 3: TITLE FOR PART ONE**

## **I. THE SIXTH CENTURY**

The traditional oration delivered at the public funeral for the fallen soldiers of the fifth and fourth centuries suggested that the Athenians had waged war with the same intensity and modus operandi from the age of the heroes to the present.<sup>4</sup> In

reality nothing could have been further from the truth: before the late-sixth-century reforms of Kleisthenes, Athens did not have a publicly-controlled army or mechanism for mobilizing soldiers and the small numbers of Athenians bothering to march out for battle did so very infrequently.<sup>5</sup> Indeed from the attempted coup of Kylon, around 630, to the assassination of Hipparkhos, in 514/3, Athenians mounted less than a dozen campaigns.<sup>6</sup> ‘This catalogue of Athenian military ventures,’ Frank Frost writes, ‘for a period of something over a century is surprisingly modest for a people who were supposed to have been so fond of fighting’.<sup>7</sup> Clearly war was not a dominant part of public life in sixth-century Athens. What ventures there were also had a limited goal: the winning of new agricultural land either on the borders of Attike (e.g. *Ath. Pol.* 14.1; Herodotos 1.59.4; 1.139.2) or in colonies overseas (e.g. Herodotos 6.36).<sup>8</sup> A good example of such a campaign is the last battle between Athens and Megara for the control of Salamis.<sup>9</sup> **SLIDE 4: ISLAND OF SALAMIS** Solon re-kindled Athenian interest in taking the island by performing a ‘nationalist’ poem in the city’s marketplace and promised its land to those wishing to volunteer for the campaign (Plutarch *Solon* 9.2). Five-hundred Athenians did volunteer, with the portion charged with capturing the island’s settlement fitting on one ship (9.3). The same type of warfare was waged by the other mainland cities of sixth-century Greece.<sup>10</sup> They went to war infrequently and for the sake of contested border land. Their campaigns took days or weeks to decide; were normally settled by a solitary clash of hoplite phalanxes; and usually did not result in the subjugation, occupation or taxation of the defeated city.<sup>11</sup> Indeed even in the classical period those cities not aspiring to be regional or imperial powers, like Athens, Sparta and Thebes, persisted with this limited style of land warfare.<sup>12</sup>

In this traditional warfare battle was called – like a political debate or sporting competition – an *agōn* (‘contest’) and conducted according to an agreed set of *nomoi* or customs.<sup>13</sup> A city informed another of its intention to attack by sending it a herald (cf. Thoukydides 1.29.1). Once its army arrived in the *khōra* (‘countryside’) of the enemy, it began destroying crops and looting livestock and property. However, as an army could not normally destroy a great deal, ravaging had a ‘more symbolic’ goal: to provoke the other hoplites to come out for a pitched battle (e.g. Pseudo-Xenophon 2.14; Thoukydides 2.11.6-8).<sup>14</sup> **SLIDE 5: PHALANX WARFARE** Once the other side had risen to the challenge and taken the field, the two phalanxes would draw up by ‘some agreement, tacit or explicit’ in an agricultural plain – the topography best suited for a battle between hoplites (e.g. Herodotos 7.9.2; Plutarch *Moralia* 193e).<sup>15</sup> **SLIDE 6: OPEN-ORDER PHALANX** After hours of fighting, the decisive moment was the *tropē* (‘turning’), when the hoplites of one side broke up and ran for their

lives (e.g. Euripides *Children of Herakles* 841-2). The victors only pursued them for a short distance, as they had much left to do on the field of battle. There they collected and identified the bodies of their fallen comrades, stripped the bodies of the enemy, and used some of the weapons and armour so acquired to set up a *tropaion* ('trophy') on the exact spot where the *tropē* had occurred (e.g. 786-7; Thucydides 4.44.2-3). The defeated sent a herald to those controlling the battlefield for a truce to collect their dead (e.g. Thucydides 4.97.2). Custom dictated that the victors could not honourably refuse this request. But asking for such a truce was recognized as the decisive proof of a concession of defeat (e.g. Herodotus 1.82; Thucydides 4.44.5-6).

The military ventures of sixth-century Athens were initiated and led – not by the rudimentary political institutions of the city – but by ambitious leaders of aristocratic *genē* ('clans'), who raised volunteer hoplites by promising the land they might win in battle.<sup>16</sup> This picture of small private armies mirrors what else we know of public life in sixth-century Athens.<sup>17</sup> While the evidence is spotty, it is significant that before 508/7 the Athenian assembly is attested to have met only once (*Ath. Pol.* 14.1; Herodotus 1.59.4-5) and to have had only two minor political functions: the election of magistrates and the review of their performance (Aristotle *Politics* 1274a16-17).<sup>18</sup> Instead public life largely consisted of a contest between the leaders of two or three clans for acknowledged preeminence. **SLIDE 7: CHARIOT RACING** Although clan leaders got ahead by winning magistracies for themselves or fellow clansmen, most of their esteem was built up through their conspicuous consumption on religious dedications, family tombs and chariot-racing and conspicuous actions in the form of priesthoods and the conducting of private military ventures. This could be a high-stakes contest that sometimes resulted in one or another leader and his clan forced out of the city by their rivals, with public life eventually breaking down into the long tyranny of Peisistratos and his sons. While the tyrants now monopolized the waging of wars (Thucydides 6.54.5), for which they employed foreign mercenaries, such as Scythian archers and Thracian peltasts, they did not prevent individual Athenian hoplites from joining their expeditions.<sup>19</sup> Aristotle's suggestion that Peisistratos disarmed the city's small number of hoplites, in 546/5, is clearly unreliable (*Ath. Pol.* 15.3-4): it contains anachronisms and is contradicted by other literary and archaeological evidence.<sup>20</sup> However the tyrants apparently did little to improve indigenous military capacity, as, in 508/7, two years after their expulsion, the Athenians were unable to prevent a 'small force' of Spartans from invading Attika and occupying the Akropolis (Herodotus 5.72).<sup>21</sup>

**SLIDE 8: ARCHAIC HOPLITE** The hoplite phalanxes of sixth-century Athens were small. The limited objectives of the campaigns and the haphazard

recruitment of volunteers point to armies of hundreds rather than thousands of hoplites (cf. Plutarch *Solon* 9.3). Since the main goal of archaic warfare was to capture new agricultural land, some of these volunteer hoplites would have been non-elite Athenians seeking to improve their personal circumstances. Nonetheless upper-class Athenians of the period were no less acquisitive than lower-class compatriots, could easily afford hoplite weapons and armour (see below), and were under the strongest moral and social obligation to be soldiers.<sup>22</sup> Thus a majority of the city's several-hundred hoplites were most probably elite Athenians. Indeed Henk Singor concludes from his research on the pre-classical phalanx that 'the typical hoplites of archaic Greece' were 'generally those belonging to the elite of society'.<sup>23</sup>

How aristocrats of sixth-century Athens represented their activities as hoplites can be seen in their ostentatious burials and the imagery on archaic black- and red-figure pottery. While the finely painted pots of the period were no doubt consumed by elite and non-elite Athenians, their pictures evoked the social milieu and outlook of the upper class.<sup>24</sup> Military scenes on such vessels, dating from the mid-sixth to the early-fifth centuries, have been superbly analyzed by François Lissarrague.<sup>25</sup> **SLIDE 9: COVER OF LISSARRAGUE** They show how elite Athenians articulated age, gender and social distinctions around the figure of the heavily-armed soldier and employed the values and models of epic poetry to represent their own martial deeds.<sup>26</sup> A good example of this epic influence concerns the scenes of a hoplite killed in action or his corpse being carried back to the city.<sup>27</sup> **SLIDE 10: DEAD HOPLITES** Iliadic heroes succinctly explain that they will gain everlasting renown and eternal memory of their youthfulness by dying bravely in battle (e.g. Homer *Iliad* 12.318-28, 22.71-3, 304-5; cf. 22.362-4).<sup>28</sup> By his 'beautiful death' a hero gains a categorical confirmation of his *aretē* or manly excellence, which – along with his everlasting youth, is reflected in the beauty of his corpse (e.g. 22.71-3, 369-71).<sup>29</sup> Attic painters sometimes represent this *aretē* of the Athenian hoplite killed in action by painting in a lion – one of the animals Homer uses as a symbol of a hero's martial excellence (e.g. Homer *Iliad* 5.782; *Odyssey* 18.161, 11.611).<sup>30</sup> Additionally they evoke his attainment of the 'beautiful death' of the heroes by giving him alone of the painted figures long hair and – along with his bearer – a Boiotian shield. Homer repeatedly draws attention to the long hair of his warrior heroes (e.g. Homer *Iliad* 3.43; 2.443, 472; 18.359), with the Boiotian shield consistently given to a named hero in Attic imagery.<sup>31</sup>

**SLIDE 11: ARCHAIC TOMBSTONES** An elite citizen of sixth-century Athens was also styled as an epic hero by his grave, whether he had died on or off the battlefield: its high mound, walled enclosure, and funerary sculpture depicting him as

a hoplite, athlete or in some other normative role of the elite was modeled on the standard monumental tomb of epic poetry, which helped guarantee the eternal renown and memory of the hero (e.g. *Iliad* 7.86-91; *Odyssey* 4.584-5).<sup>32</sup> Similarly the epigrams of elite Athenian tombs – like those of the fallen soldiers, Kroisos, Tettikhos and Xenokles – drew heavily on the vocabulary, imagery and concepts of epic poetry.<sup>33</sup>

## SLIDE 12: TITLE FOR PART TWO

### II. THE FIFTH CENTURY

Fifth-century Athens ‘widened, amplified, and intensified’ the waging of war and was ‘a constant source of death and destruction’ among the Greeks.<sup>34</sup> The cumulative weight of this Athenian military revolution – it is often argued – destroyed the traditional *nomoi* or customs of battle.<sup>35</sup> Athenian warfare was transformed institutionally by the reforms Kleisthenes introduced after 508/7 (*Ath. Pol.* 20-1; Herodotos 5.66-73).<sup>36</sup> **SLIDE 13: KLEISTHENIC REFORMS** These reforms effectively unified Athens and its countryside for the first time: each free male of Attike was now registered as a citizen of Athens in his local deme and groups of these villages and suburbs from across Attike were linked together in ten tribes, which served (among other things) as the subdivisions of a new popular council and publicly-controlled army of hoplites.<sup>37</sup> The new registers of citizens in the demes were used to conscript hoplites for each tribal corps (e.g. Aristophanes *Peace* 1173, 1179-86; *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 138.1-2, 5-6).<sup>38</sup> This was the city’s first-ever mechanism for mass mobilization and the standard way for raising hoplites throughout the classical period. As Attike was around twenty-times larger and more populous than the averaged-sized *khōra* of a Greek city, this new system of mobilization gave the Athenians a huge military advantage.<sup>39</sup> Demography would remain one of the three bases of the military might of fifth-century Athens.

Again for the first time Kleisthenes formally integrated the Athenian *dēmos* (‘people’) into politics by making laws and public actions dependent on the approval of the assembly and the new popular Council of Five Hundred.<sup>40</sup> Within several years the people were making the final decisions about activities once pursued privately by elite Athenians, such as foreign affairs and warfare (e.g. Herodotos 5.66, 96-7). Certainly it took several more decades for the institutions of democracy and its core concepts to be fully elaborated.<sup>41</sup> However, as Kleisthenes had made the *dēmos* the final arbiters of public policy, his reforms – as Josiah Ober suggests – marked the true beginning of Athenian *dēmokratia* and framed its future development. To lead

the new publicly-controlled army effectively the Athenians created, in 501/0, a board of ten generals, who were drawn – like other newly-created magistrates – one from each Kleisthenic tribe.<sup>42</sup> **SLIDE 14: BATTLE OF MARATHON** The reforms of Kleisthenes quickly unleashed a new bellicosity (Herodotos 5.78): in 506 the new army defeated those of Khalkis and Boiotia in successive battles (5.74-7); in 499 the Athenians sent an armada of twenty ships to help the Ionians revolt from Persia (97-103); and, in 490, at the battle of Marathon they deployed 9000 heavy infantrymen – a hoplite army far larger than any other Greek city (including Sparta).

**SLIDE 15: TRIREME** Practical change in the waging of war effectively began, in 483/2, with the decision of the Athenian *dēmos* to use a windfall of silver to build a fleet of two-hundred triremes (*Ath. Pol.* 22.7; Herodotos 7.144; Plutarch *Themistokles* 14.2) and the expedition of the Great King, three years later, to subjugate the Greeks of the mainland as the Persians had those of Ionia and the Hellespont.<sup>43</sup> The defeat of what remained of Xerxes' expeditionary force at Plataea and Mykale, in 479, and the inability of the Spartans to effectively lead the liberation of the Ionians saw the Athenians invited to found the so-called Delian League – a voluntary alliance of cities contributing ships and troops or tribute to Athenian-lead expeditions (Thoukydides 1.94-7).<sup>44</sup> **SLIDE 16: GREECE AND THE AEGEAN** For its first decade the League campaigned frequently to expel Persian forces from strong points and naval bases across the Aegean, destroy the Phoenician fleet and liberate Greek cities (e.g. 1.97-8).<sup>45</sup> At the same time the Athenians began a process of eroding the independence of their allies (e.g. 1.98.4), who, by the early 440s, were obliged to pay annual tribute, subject to relevant laws of the Athenian *dēmos*, and prevented (forcefully if necessary) from pulling out of the Athenian *arkhē* ('empire').<sup>46</sup>

Imperial tribute ensured the democracy had sufficient resources to pioneer new forms of warfare and to employ vast numbers of non-elite Athenians as soldiers.<sup>47</sup> The Athenians were now moving large numbers of ships and infantry across the entire eastern Mediterranean for campaigns lasting months or, in the case of sieges, around a year.<sup>48</sup> They did so much more frequently than before, waging war on average for two out of three years in the fifth century and never having peace for more than a decade.<sup>49</sup> They were also able to support multiple theatres of operation simultaneously (e.g. Thoukydides 1.105; 2.39.3; Lysias 2.50-1).

Fifth-century Athens not only intensified warfare but invented new forms of military action. Before Philip II of Macedon siege warfare was rudimentary in the eastern Mediterranean: besiegers tried to starve a city into capitulation by blockading its harbour and using counter walls to cut access to its *khōra*.<sup>50</sup> Since this could take more than a year to be effective, the Athenians of the early fifth-century were forced

to abandon sieges for want of sufficient resources (e.g. Herodotos 6.135; 9.75). But tribute allowed them to conduct sieges successfully, from which they gained a reputation for special expertise in siege warfare (e.g. Thoukydides 1.102.2). The Athenians treated the inhabitants of a besieged city which surrendered differently to hoplites captured on the battlefield: they typically executed the men and sold the women and children into slavery, probably leaving the elderly and babies to die of starvation, exposure or attack by wolves and dogs (e.g. Xenophon *Agésilaios* 1.21-2).<sup>51</sup> In doing so they were no more or less brutal than others dealing with captured cities and were acting according to new, recognized *nomoi* for siege warfare (e.g. Xenophon *Hellenika* 1.6.14; *Memorabilia* 4.2.15).<sup>52</sup>

**SLIDE 17: NAVAL BATTLE** Imperial tribute allowed the Athenians not just to put large fleets to sea (already an extremely expensive exercise) but to train their crews for weeks or months.<sup>53</sup> So trained, each crew could work collectively to turn their ship into an offensive weapon in its own right and could take part in manoeuvres at speed with other ships in order to break through or outflank the lines of an enemy fleet.<sup>54</sup> Tactical retreat was a standard element of this new form of naval warfare (e.g. Thoukydides 2.91.1-92.2).

The Athenians also set themselves apart by building vast fortifications to protect their *astu* (urban centre) and port.<sup>55</sup> **SLIDE 18: FORTIFICATIONS** Immediately after the Persian Wars the entire population of Athens mobilized to quickly build the walls of the city and the Piraeus (Thoukydides 1.89.3-103.8).<sup>56</sup> In 458/7 the Athenian *dēmos* resolved to build two walls from the city, one to the northern edge of the port and the other to the eastern end of the Bay of Phaleron (1.108.3-4; Diodoros 11.81.1-83.3), completing these six kilometres of new walls in just one year.<sup>57</sup> Finally, in 446/5, they started to build another wall between city and port, parallel to the existing one to the north (Aiskhines 2.174; Andokides 3.7). ‘The construction of such an elaborate system of fortifications in such a brief period is a staggering achievement, especially when it is remembered that the Athenians were at war for most of the period and consequently capable of diverting manpower into constructive work only during the brief periods afforded by peace.’<sup>58</sup> Such unprecedented fortifications enabled the Athenians to respond to any invasion of their *khōra* in a novel way: they could withdraw their rural population and moveable property within the fortified Athens–Piraeus complex, transport livestock to islands they controlled and rely on the imported grain and tribute guaranteed by their control of the sea (Pseudo-Xenophon 2.16). This new option was first pursued at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War as part of the grand strategy of the city’s leading politician, Perikles (Thoukydides 1.143.4-5).<sup>59</sup> Thus, in 431, when the combined army of the

Peloponnesian League ravaged Attike, Perikles overcame vocal opposition and convinced his fellow citizens to remain within the walls (2.21.2-3).<sup>60</sup> Such opposition is easy to understand: Perikles was breaking the custom of battle to march out and fight those plundering one's countryside (cf. 2.20; Isokrates 8.77).

Periklean strategy also added a new deployment of Athenian hoplites outside of the phalanx to the several they had picked up in the previous fifty years.<sup>61</sup> Perikles organized for armadas to sail around the Peloponnese from which hoplites would disembark, ravage the countryside and, in the face of stiff opposition, flee back to their ships.<sup>62</sup> This use of retreat as a tactic clearly broke the Greek custom of battle that flight was sure proof of defeat. The successors of Perikles convinced the Athenians to depart further from traditional warfare by permanently occupying a strong point in Messenia whose aim was to attack the economic base of Spartan power, the subjugation of the Messenians (Thoukydides 5.14.3-4).<sup>63</sup> Established in 425 and manned by Messenians who had escaped from their Spartan masters, this *phylakē* (fort) served as a base for ravaging Spartan farmland and encouraging an uprising of the Helots (e.g. 4.41.1-3; 5.115.2; 6.105.)

Victory in the Peloponnesian War ended up going to the Spartans, once they had broken free of the practices of archaic warfare and copied several of the military innovations of their enemy.<sup>64</sup> Thus, in 413, at the suggestion of the Athenian exile, Alkibiades (6.91.6; 7.10, 18-19, 27-8), the Spartans fortified the strong point of Dekeleia in Attike, leading to the Athenian loss of twenty-thousand slaves, livestock and property (7.27.5; *Oxyrhynchus Historian* 12.4). These losses – in addition to raiding parties regularly sent out from Dekeleia – seriously disrupted Athenian agriculture and hence greatly increased the city's dependence on grain imported from the region of the Black Sea.<sup>65</sup> In exchange for handing back the Ionian Greeks to the Great King (Thoukydides 8.18, 37, 58), the Spartans received sufficient Persian gold to build, man and train a fleet, which quickly came to surpass in number and quality what remained of the Athenian navy after the destruction of the city's expeditionary force to Sicily. Finally, in 405/4, they destroyed the last of the Athenian ships in the Hellespont, enabling them to stop the grain ships bound for Athens and to force the capitulation of its citizens by a land and sea blockade (Xenophon *Hellenika* 2.1.27-2.2.9).

Admittedly this new style of waging war saw the Athenians adopt new customs of battle with sieges and ignore – whenever they wished – one or another of the traditional *nomoi* of battle. But to argue (as is often done) that war was now waged 'without limits and without rules' seems to confuse the innovations of fifth-century Athenian warfare with the customs of the battlefield.<sup>66</sup> Indeed classical Athenians

would have completely rejected such an argument (e.g. Thucydides 4.97-9). **SLIDE 19: FUNERAL ORATION OF LYSIAS** After all a standard myth of the Athenian funeral oration – and one dramatized on the tragic stage (Euripides *Suppliant Women*) – was the city’s victory over their Boiotian neighbours, which secured a proper burial for the Argives who had been killed assaulting Thebes.<sup>67</sup> According to this myth, the Athenians fought the Thebans, not because of any territorial dispute (Lysias 2.9), but because they judged the Theban refusal to hand over the bodies of the defeated for burial to be a violation of a hallowed Greek custom (e.g. Euripides *Suppliant Women* 16-19, 61-2, 306-12, 526-7, 561-3). Since the myths of the funeral oration served to articulate and legitimate Athenian self-identity, this exploit attests to the belief of the Athenians in their superlative commitment to the traditional customs of battle.<sup>68</sup>

Additionally throughout the classical period Athenian hoplites regularly fought in phalanx-based battles that still followed the traditional customs of battle (Demosthenes 9.44-52).<sup>69</sup> Finally, the new non-phalanx modes of combat the Athenians pioneered actually followed as best as they could the *nomoi* of traditional hoplite warfare: for example, if victorious, Athenian sailors set up a *tropaion* at a site closely linked with their victory, endeavoured to collect their own dead and wrecked ships and gave back the bodies of the defeated under truce (e.g. Thucydides 2.92.4-5; 4.14.5; cf. 4.38.4).

What is undeniable is that the military revolution of fifth-century Athens was made possible by an unprecedented level of involvement of non-elite citizens in warfare and an extraordinary commitment on their part to fight and (if necessary) die for Athens.<sup>70</sup> Athenian democracy opened soldiering – like politics – to every strata of the citizen-body. At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War thirty percent of Athenian citizens were hoplites, with 13,000 of these available for active duty (Thucydides 2.13.6-7).<sup>71</sup> Traditionally historians of classical Athens have assumed that serving as a hoplite was compulsory for every citizen that belonged to the third lowest of Solon’s property classes.<sup>72</sup> This assumption can no longer be made, since we now know that ‘no ancient source identifies the Solonic *zeugitai* as hoplites or hoplites as *zeugitai*’ and that only a small fraction of the city’s hoplites were ever prosperous enough to qualify for this class.<sup>73</sup> It appears then that while Athenian hoplites were usually conscripted for campaigns, each of them had made a decision to be a hoplite in the first place. **SLIDE 20: HOPLITE PANOPLY** To be part of the phalanx, a citizen had to provide his own weapons and armour, which could cost months of wages.<sup>74</sup> Additionally fighting as a hoplite was rightly perceived as much more dangerous than service as a cavalryman or archer.<sup>75</sup> Thus that thirty percent of citizens, despite these disincentives, volunteered to be hoplites is remarkable. The

Athenian commitment to building and maintaining a massive war fleet made soldiering possible for the majority of citizens who were too poor to be hoplites.<sup>76</sup>

**SLIDE 21: LENORMANT RELIEF** Typically rowers were not conscripted for each expedition but volunteered their services to the upper-class commanders of individual triremes.<sup>77</sup> Naval service was demanding and could also be very dangerous.<sup>78</sup> Throughout the century a changing proportion of sailors in the fleet were resident aliens (e.g. Thoukydides 1.143.1; 7.63.3-4), allies (e.g. 1.121.3, 7.13.2) and slaves (e.g. 7.13.2).<sup>79</sup> But the largest portion, numbering thousands per expedition, appear to have been Athenian (e.g. Thoukydides 1.142.6, 8.74-7; Pseudo-Xenophon 1.2).<sup>80</sup>

Certainly the participation of so many non-elite citizens in military affairs was facilitated by the introduction of military pay.<sup>81</sup> Payment for sailors began with the second Persian War (e.g. *Ath Pol.* 23.1; Plutarch *Kimón* 9.4; *Themistokles* 10.4), while hoplites probably began to be paid at the same time, in the 450s, when pay was introduced for the city's councilors and jurors (*Ath. Pol.* 27.3-4; Plato *Gorgias* 515e).<sup>82</sup> While military pay – along with the economic benefits of empire – would have motivated poor Athenians to be active militarily (e.g. Thoukydides 6.24.3), they were not the only motivations nor do they adequately explain why fifth-century Athenians were so committed to waging war and so reconciled to falling in battle for the city.<sup>83</sup> By the early 460s military service had come to be seen as the duty of every citizen.<sup>84</sup> Apparently the Athenian people took this new obligation very seriously: they passed laws stripping political rights from those found guilty of draft-dodging or desertion (e.g. Aristophanes *Knights* 443; *Wasps* 1117-21; Pseudo-Xenophon 3.5); conscripted every citizen available, on several occasions, to man the ships (e.g. Xenophon *Hellenika* 2.6.24-5; cf. Thoukydides 3.16.1, 17.1-3) or march against a neighbouring city (e.g. Thoukydides 2.31.1-3; 4.90.1, 94.1-2); and accepted the high numbers of casualties regularly killed in action.<sup>85</sup> For example, in 460/59 the Erekhtheis tribe lost 177 members in battles by land and sea in mainland Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and the Levant (*IG I<sup>3</sup>* 1147). Even more extraordinary is the impact of the Peloponnesian War on Athenian demography: in 431 there were most probably 60,000 citizens living in Attike, but, after twenty-five years of war, only 23,000 adult citizens were left.<sup>86</sup>

## SLIDE 22: TITLE FOR PART THREE

### III. DEMOCRATIC BELLICOSITY

Contemporaries reflected on this extraordinary bellicosity and self-sacrifice of fifth-century Athenians. Perikles, for example, reminded the Athenians, before his death, that their city has the greatest *dynamis* ('military power') in history, because they have expended more lives and *ponoi* ('painful toils bringing honour') than any other (Thoukydides 2.62-3; cf. 2.36.2; Lysias 2.55). Likewise would-be enemies spoke of the military adventurism of the Athenians, their willingness to sacrifice themselves in war, and how 'they were born neither to have peace themselves nor to let other men have it' (1.70). Aristophanes joked that his fellow citizens would launch a fleet of 300 triremes instantly, if the Spartans so much as stole a puppy from an insignificant member of their empire (*Akharnians* 540-54), while Euripides made out that the military activism of contemporary Athenians went back to the heroic age (*Suppliant Women* 572-6).

This bellicosity and its related military innovations were closely linked to 'the political situation and psychology of the lower-class citizens'.<sup>87</sup> The new relationship between elite performers and non-elite spectators under the democracy encouraged military efficiency and the recognition and praise of mass participation in warfare. Even after the reforms of 508/7 Athenian leaders were still members of the upper class engaging in a battle for preeminence with each other.<sup>88</sup> Now, however, their rivalries were played out in *agōnes* or political debates (e.g. Thoukydides 3.38.3-4, 40.4), with the final decision to support this or that leader resting with predominantly non-elite assembly-goers and councilors.<sup>89</sup> **SLIDE 23: PNYX** To win over such notoriously boisterous and censorious audiences (e.g. Aiskhylos *Suppliant Women* 483; Plato *Republic* 492b-c), politicians had to negotiate, confirm and articulate the self-perceptions, norms and perceived interests of lower class Athenians. The city's *agōnes* for tragedies and comedies ostensibly had a similar performance dynamic.<sup>90</sup> **SLIDE 24: THEATRE OF DIONYSOS** Although judging the winner of each contest was formally in the hands of ten magistrates, their decision was greatly influenced by the vocal and physically-active responses of the largely non-elite audience.<sup>91</sup> As Eric Csapo and William Slater observe, 'What most strikes the modern observer is the degree of public participation and public scrutiny that went into the process of judging the dramatic and dithyrambic contests, making them more akin to our national elections than to the secret deliberations of Nobel Prizes and Academy Awards.'<sup>92</sup> Apart from negotiating non-elite expectations and points of view, poets also found they gained a competitive advantage by pushing the

boundaries and possibilities of their genre, whether it be tragedy, comedy, satyric drama or dithyramb.<sup>93</sup> Theatre-goers apparently enjoyed dramaturgical innovation.

The performance dynamic of the city's political venues encouraged comparable military innovation. Foreign policy and warfare were the major topics of debate in the assembly and council of the fifth- and fourth-century democracy, with war and peace being a compulsory item of the agenda of the *ekklēsia kyria* – the main assembly meeting of each prytany (Aristophanes *Akharnians* 19-27; *Ath. Pol.* 43.4).<sup>94</sup> For politicians wanting to distinguish themselves military affairs offered 'many opportunities for disagreement, alternative plans, 'better' proposals, especially in times of war'.<sup>95</sup> As non-elite citizens risked life and limb fighting for Athens and were constantly suspicious of their military and political leaders (e.g. Aristophanes *Wasps* 650-724; *Peace* 632-48, 668-9; Lysias 27.6-8), they welcomed such rigorous debate.<sup>96</sup> Thus politicians asked questions about the ongoing campaigns rivals had promoted and suggested ways to improve their prosecution (e.g. Thucydides 4.27). This adversarial reviewing promoted the efficient conduct of military ventures.<sup>97</sup> Politicians also sought to win over non-elite audiences by suggesting general ways the city could improve their waging of wars.<sup>98</sup> **SLIDE 25: KNIGHTS** Aristophanes parodies the giving of such advice in the closing scene of *Knights*: sitting on the Pnyx itself (750), the sausage seller and Paphlagon compete for the support of old-man Demos by (amongst other things) making alternate comical proposals for improving the efficiency of the navy (1063-86).

Significantly political debates, plays and legal trials were the main forums for developing and broadcasting the agreed communal identities and shared culture of classical Athenians, which have often been called 'civic ideology'.<sup>99</sup> Since non-elite citizens had the strongest influence on its content, civic ideology reflected their perceptions of themselves and others, their particular points of view, and their perceived self-interests. Thus this ideology can also be described as 'popular thinking' or 'popular culture'.<sup>100</sup> This power of non-elite citizens to shape the city's culture ensured that the epic values and language of warfare, which had once been monopolized by Athenian aristocrats, were now applied to rich and poor citizens alike, whether they served as hoplites or sailors.<sup>101</sup>

This ideological democratization of war can be observed best in the public funeral for the war dead, held each year when Athenians were killed in action (Thucydides 2.34.1, 7-8).<sup>102</sup> **SLIDE 26: PROCESSIONAL ROUTE** Its procession carried the ashes of the fallen from the marketplace, where they had been honoured for three days (2), to the public cemetery in the Kerameikos, which was judged 'the most beautiful suburb of the city' (4-5; cf Aristophanes *Birds* 395-99). **SLIDE 27:**

**KERAMEIKOS** An empty bier was carried for those dead sailors whose bodies could not be retrieved, while the remains of the others were housed in ten caskets (one for each tribe) made of cypress (Thoukydides 2.34.3-4). Cypress wood figured in the palaces of epic heroes and was thought to guarantee the immortality of memory.<sup>103</sup> **SLIDE 28: POLYANDRION** At the public cemetery the coffins were placed in ‘a beautiful and grandiose tomb’, beyond the reach even of a wealthy family (Plato *Menexenos* 234c; cf. Xenophon *Hellenika* 2.4.17). **SLIDE 29: FRIEZE** Such tombs were adorned with statues of lions and friezes of hoplites killing opponents that signified the *aretē* of those being buried.<sup>104</sup> They also had epigrams explaining that the dead had put their *aretē* beyond doubt and left a deathless memory of it (e.g. *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 1179.3, 8-9; 1162.48). **SLIDE 30: EPIGRAM** Finally each tomb displayed a complete list of the year’s casualties, including citizen sailors, which was organized by tribes (1142-93).<sup>105</sup> **SLIDE 31: CASUALTY LIST** That these rolls of honour gave the same space to the name of each citizen, regardless of military rank or social class, underlines the democratic egalitarianism which clearly pervaded the whole funeral (e.g. Euripides fragment 360. 32-5 Collard, Cropp and Lee). The oration traditionally delivered after the burial of the war dead is notorious for devoting much more space to the patriotic myths and unfailing *aretē* of the Athenians than to the achievements of those actually being buried.<sup>106</sup> Nonetheless funeral orations did at least spell out why the dead had gained ‘the most becoming’ or ‘the most beautiful’ end (Thoukydides 2.44.1; Plato *Menexenos* 248c; cf. Lysias 2.79): their death in battle for the commonwealth (Thoukydides 2.43.2) or its mighty and very fine ideals (Lysias 2.79; cf. Hypereides *Funeral Oration* 27-28) resulted in ageless praise (Thoukydides 2.43.2) and ageless renown (Demosthenes 60.32; cf. Thoukydides 2.44.4; Plato *Menexenos* 247d). It also gave them a deathless remembrance (Lysias 2.81; cf. 2.79; Hypereides *Funeral Oration* 27-30) not only of their *aretē* (Lysias 2.80) but also of their youthfulness, as their premature demise had spared them the ravages and disability of old age (Lysias 2.78-79; Demosthenes 60.32-33; Hypereides *Funeral Oration* 42-43). **SLIDE 32: BLUE SCREEN**

The bravery and toils of non-elite hoplites and sailors were also recognized in the other forums of popular culture (e.g. Aristophanes *Akharnians* 695-8; *Wasps* 683-5). Elsewhere I explain how the hoplite, despite the Athenian military revolution, maintained a central and normative position ideologically.<sup>107</sup> General comments about war and citizenship and distinctions of age, gender and ethnicity were consistently articulated around this soldier, while his experience of phalanx battles defined martial excellence. Nonetheless popular culture was flexible enough for citizen sailors to receive their share of praise and recognition.<sup>108</sup> Naval skills were

seen to be ‘national’ traits handed down from the age of the heroes, while sailors were acknowledged for their bravery and thought to be a major source of the city’s military power.

This positive and generous treatment of non-elite soldiers contrasted markedly with the popular assessment of their social circumstances. Poor citizens may have taken control of public life under the democracy but they were still ashamed of their poverty.<sup>109</sup> Poverty was considered a disability, like old age or a physical handicap (e.g. Lysias 24.16-17), which resulted in socio-political disadvantages (e.g. Aristophanes *Wealth* 218-21; Demosthenes 21.141-2) and, at times, shameful acts and criminality.<sup>110</sup> Poor citizens understandably longed to be wealthy one day.<sup>111</sup> This negative view of their personal circumstances made warfare psychologically satisfying for a poor citizen. Soldiering put him on the same level as elite fellow citizens and the heroes of epic poetry. By doing so he was recognized as *khrēstos politēs* (‘a useful citizen’) or *khrēsimos tēi polēi* (‘useful to the city’).<sup>112</sup> Fifth-century Athens, then, gave its vast numbers of non-elite citizens compelling economic *and* cultural reasons to wage war as regularly as possible.

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<sup>1</sup> For classical Athens as an exceptional centre of cultural development in the Greek world, see Boedeker and Raaflaub 1998; Brock and Hodkinson 2002b, 4.

<sup>2</sup> For the constant glorification and legitimizing of war in the popular culture, visual arts and literature of classical Athens, see, for example, Garland 1995, 53-4; Raaflaub 1994, 119; and especially Raaflaub 2001, 323-8.

<sup>3</sup> For this relative expenditure on war, see Kallet 1998; van Wees 2000, 81. For its dominance of political debate, Raaflaub 2001, 319.

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<sup>4</sup> For this static view of Athenian history in the funeral oration, see Loraux 1986, 291; Pritchard 1996, 148; 2000a, 25-6.

<sup>5</sup> The following discussion of the land warfare of sixth-century Athens and the creation of the first publicly-controlled army by Kleisthenes draws on Anderson 2003, 149-50, 259 nn.9-12; Frost 1981, 35; 1984; Pritchard 2000a, 132-4; Siewert 1982; Singor 2000; van Effenterre 1976; cf. Rosivach 2002, 36, 39. For the similarly private nautical activities of sixth-century Athens, see Gabrielsen 1994, 19-26; Haas 1985; de Souza 1998. For a solid case for small numbers of Athenian horsemen in the sixth century, see Bugh 1988, 1-38; cf. Anderson 1961, 130.

<sup>6</sup> For the testimonia of these ventures, see Frost 1984; Sealey 1976, 140-5. This tally counts the coups of Kylon and Peisistratos, in 546/5, as two ventures each. *Pace* Frost (1984, 291) I believe the Peisistratids involved citizen hoplites in their campaigns until 514/3 (see below). Thus I include their campaigns against Sigeion (Herodotos 5.94-5) and Naxos (1.64.2; *Ath. Pol.* 15.3) but not those against the Spartans and Alkmeonids after the assassination of Hipparkhos (Herodotos 5.62-3).

<sup>7</sup> Quotation from Frost 1984, 292.

<sup>8</sup> Despite its ostensibly new 'political' objective (Frost 1984, 292; Singor 2000, 117), Athenian expedition to protect the Plataeans from the Boiotians appears to have been motivated at least in part by land hunger; for it did lead to the expansion of the borders of Attike (Herodotos 6.108). While remaining a point of debate, Badian (1993, 116-7, 218-9 n.18) and Frost (1984, 292) make good arguments for retaining Thoukydides' date of 519 rather than Herodotos' implicit dating to the post-Peisistratid period.

for following the testimony of Thoukydides (3.68.5) rather than Herodotos

<sup>9</sup> See Demosthenes 19.252; Diogenes Laertius 1.46-8; Polyainos 1.20.1-2; Pausanias 1.40.4; Plutarch *Solon* 8-10. Along with Frost (1984, 289) I prefer the more detailed version of the actual fighting for the island at Plutarch *Solon* 9.2-10.1 to the other involving youths cross-dressing (8.4-6; Polyainos 1.20.2).

<sup>10</sup> For good general descriptions of archaic warfare, see Hanson 2001, 5-7; Raaflaub 1999, 134-8. The territorial goal of traditional Greek warfare is best established by de Sainte Croix 1972, 218-20 and Hanson 2000, 214-18 – both with ancient testimonia.

<sup>11</sup> The exception of course is archaic Sparta which reduced the defeated Messenians to a state of slavery (Cartledge 2001, 299-307 for the ancient testimonia) and turned itself into an armed camp to maintain their subjugation (see especially Finley 1968). *Contra* van Wees 2003.

<sup>12</sup> Connor 1988, 6-8; Garlan 1995, 55.

<sup>13</sup> This paragraph draws on Connor 1988, 8-21; Cornell 2002, 43-6; Garlan 1995, 54; Lonis 1979, 25-9; Mitchell 1996, 92-4; Ober 1996, 56; Vernant 1988, 38-44. For a dissenting view that Greek warfare had never been as rule-bound as contemporary ancient historians believe, see van Wees 2000, 93-6.

<sup>14</sup> Quotation from van Wees 2000, 98. See Foxhall 1993 and especially Hanson 1998.

<sup>15</sup> Quotation from Connor 1988, 12. See especially Hanson 2000, 206-11.

<sup>16</sup> But war was not entirely without public oversight: while nothing is known of what role the *polēmarkhos* ('war leader') played in the campaigns of sixth-century Athens, this magistracy was one of the city's oldest (*Ath. Pol.* 3.2, 22.2, cf. 58.1). See Anderson 2003, 149; Frost 1984, 285. Some archaic Athenians also swore an oath to protect the *khōra* of Athens and to remain loyal to fellow hoplites in battle (see Siewert 1977; Pritchard 2000a, 82). Note also Raaflaub 1997.

<sup>17</sup> For public life in sixth-century Athens, see Anderson 2003, 43-84, especially 67-74; Frost 1981; Osborne 1996, 215-25; Pritchard 1994, 114-18; cf. Raaflaub 1994, 115.

<sup>18</sup> See Anderson 2003, 59, 63, 234-5 n.30.

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<sup>19</sup> See Pritchard 2000a, 133-4 and Singor 2000, 117 *pace* Frost 1984, 291 and van Effenterre 1976, 3-4. For the tyrants' hiring of Scythian archers and Thracian peltasts, see Vos 1963, 70-80 and Best 1969 respectively.

<sup>20</sup> Aristotle writes that Peisistratos deprived the Athenian hoplites of their weapons by stealth during a city-wide *exoplasia* ('military review') in the sanctuary of Theseus (*Ath. Pol.* 15.4). Yet the existence of a formal mechanism for mustering troops is improbable in light of the otherwise disorganized nature of Athenian warfare in this period. This sanctuary was built only after the Persian Wars (Rhodes 1981, 210-11). This suggestion of Aristotle is also directly contradicted by Thucydides 6.56.2 and 6.58.1-2, where Hippias uses a very similar ruse to disarm hoplites in 514/3, while Herodotus describes wars being fought by 'the Athenians' during the tyranny (5.94-5; 6.108). Finally we have the copious numbers of Athenian pots of the second half of the sixth century with images of contemporary hoplites and horsemen (see, for example, Lissarrague 1990; cf. 1989). The popularity of such images is not easy to explain if Peisistratos disarmed the Athenian in 546/5.

<sup>21</sup> Van Effenterre 1976, 4.

<sup>22</sup> Solon for his part bemoans elite acquisitiveness and introduces reforms to moderate it (see now Balot 2001, 73-98 with ancient testimonia). For this strong obligation for the elite to be soldiers, see Dickie 1984, 250; Gabrielsen 2002, 87; van Wees 2004, 37-45, 55-60.

<sup>23</sup> Quotation from Singor 2000, 107. Drews comes to a similar conclusion (1972, 140-4).

<sup>24</sup> This was most probably the case for the classical period (see Pritchard 1999; Vickers 2002). For this approach to images as evidence of mentality (called iconology), see Lissarrague 1990, 1-12; Sabetai 1997, 330-1; Sparkes 1996, 135-9.

<sup>25</sup> Lissarrague 1990 – discussed at Pritchard 2000a, 126-31.

<sup>26</sup> See especially Lissarrague 1990, 233-40; cf. Balot 2004, 411.

<sup>27</sup> Lissarrague 1990, 71-96. These scenes date approximately from 570 to 480 (71-2, 233). Another good example concerns hoplites arming for battle (Lissarrague 1990, 35-53). Before narrating their martial exploits, Homer regularly describes how heroes arm themselves, beginning by fastening their greaves (e.g. *Iliad* 3.330-8, 11.17-44, 16.131-44, 19.369-91). This use of arming by epic as a pointer to a display of *aretē* (e.g. 19.36) and its stress on greaves explain why scenes of hoplites arming are so extraordinarily popular in sixth-century Athens and consist usually of a naked man placing greaves on his shins (Lissarrague 1990, 36, 42).

<sup>28</sup> The classic study of the 'beautiful death' is Vernant 1991, 50-74; cf. Redfield 1975, 100-1.

<sup>29</sup> Vernant 1991, 62-4.

<sup>30</sup> Lissarrague 1990, 75-6; Vernant 1991, 50. For an example of such an image, see Lissarrague 1990, 82-5, no. 79 (NAM 433).

<sup>31</sup> For the long hair of heroes, see Lissarrague 1990, 75; Vernant 1991, 65-7. For this signification of the Boiotian shield in Attic imagery, see Lissarrague 1990, 76; Vos 1963, 33, 36.

<sup>32</sup> For gravestones with hoplites, see, for example, Richter 1961, nos. 27, 45, 46, 65-7.; cf. Richter 1944. For athletes, see, for example, Measham, Spathari and Donnelly 2000, cat. nos. 24, 30, 43; Richter 1961, nos. 26, 28. For the elite burials of sixth century Athens in general, see Kurtz and Boardman 1977, 68-90. In place of such a gravestone an elite tomb often had a *kouros*, which brought to the fore very different ideas about the death (see Osborne 1988, 6-9). For the appropriation of epic in the funeral ceremony and tomb, see Balot 2001, 76-7; Houby-Nielsen 1995.

<sup>33</sup> For the epigram of Kroisos and its epic appropriations, Friedländer 1948, no. 82; Hansen 1983, no. 27; Anderson 2003, 27-9. For Tettikhos, Friedländer 1948, no. 135; Hansen 1983, no. 13; Anderson 2003, 153. For Xenokles, Friedländer 1948, no. 87; Hansen 1983, no. 19; Robertson 2003; cf. 1997.

<sup>34</sup> Quotations from Hanson 2001, 4, 24.

<sup>35</sup> E.g. de Romilly 1968; Mitchell 1996, 101; Ober 1996, 54, 62; Vernant 1988, 44.

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<sup>36</sup> For a penetrating analysis of the events of 508/7 and the roles of Kleisthenes and the Athenian *dēmos* in 508/7, see Ober 1996, 18-31. For the details of the reforms and their political significance, see Meier 1990, 53-81; Ostwald 1986, 15-28.

<sup>37</sup> That this unification was achieved only at the very end of the sixth century as a result of these reforms is put beyond doubt by Anderson 2003, 13-42. Each tribe also provided a chorus of boys and another of men for the dithyrambic contest introduced to the Great Dionysia at this time (see Pritchard 2004).

<sup>38</sup> Note also Meiggs and Lewis 1969, no. 23. See Christ 2001, 398-403; Frost 1984, 284; Hansen 1986, 83-9; Pritchard 1995; van Effenterre 1976, 7-17 – all with primary sources.

<sup>39</sup> Anderson 2003, 3; Brock and Hodkinson 2002b, 9; Hanson 2001, 23-4.

<sup>40</sup> Established superbly by Anderson 2003, 43-84, especially 52-7, 79-83.

<sup>41</sup> Ober 1998, 70-4.

<sup>42</sup> See Hansen 1991, 34-5 and especially Fornara 1971; cf. Hamel 1998a.

<sup>43</sup> With Pritchard 1994, 121.

<sup>44</sup> See especially Meiggs 1972, 42-9.

<sup>45</sup> Meiggs 1972, 68-83.

<sup>46</sup> While Thoukydides' *Pentecontaetia* suggests that the alliance was transformed into an *arkhē* within one or two decades, this process appears to have taken much longer (see Meiggs 1972, especially 152-74; *contra* Fornara and Samons 1991, 76-113). While an empire, Thoukydides' speakers are not justified in characterizing it as a 'tyranny' detested by its subjects: de Sainte Croix 1954 shows how the poor citizens of allied cities valued Athenian suzerainty at least as a check against the social violence and politically restrictive programs of their wealthy compatriots (see Meiggs 1972, 404-12; Pritchard 1991).

<sup>47</sup> For penetrating analyses of the financial and other bases of this new democratic warfare, see Raaflaub 1991; 1999, 141-4.

<sup>48</sup> Raaflaub 1999, 141.

<sup>49</sup> As is often noted (e.g. Garlan 1995, 53; Raaflaub 1999, 141; van Wees 2000, 82).

<sup>50</sup> See Garlan 1968; 1974; Hanson 2001, 11-12; van Wees 2000, 94, 101-4.

<sup>51</sup> E.g. Diodoros 12.73.3, 12.76.3-4; Thoukydides 5.3.4, 5.11.3, 5.32.1.

<sup>52</sup> See Connor 1988, 15 n.59 and de Sainte Croix 1954, 14-16 *pace* Ober 1996, 62. Connor puts it well (1989, 15 n.59): 'Siege warfare too was governed by a code, but a radically different one from that which applied to hoplite battles.'

<sup>53</sup> For calculations concerning the otherwise prohibitive cost of naval warfare, see Raaflaub 1999, 142 with references. For the training of Athenian sailors, see, for example, Plutarch *Kimon* 11.2-3; Pseudo-Xenophon 1.19-20; Thoukydides 1.80; 1.142.6-7; 2.84-86, 89; Xenophon *Memorabilia* 3.5.18.

<sup>54</sup> For the tactics of Athenian fleets, see Morrison 1974; Morrison and Coates 1986, 25-45; Pritchard 2000a, 115-17.

<sup>55</sup> Hanson 2001, 10-1; Raaflaub 1999, 142.

<sup>56</sup> With Pritchard 1994, 122 n.65.

<sup>57</sup> See Garland 1987, 22-6.

<sup>58</sup> Quotation from Garland 1987, 25-6.

<sup>59</sup> For this strategy of Perikles, see Mitchell 1996, 97; Ober 1996, 65-6, 72-85; Spence 1990.

<sup>60</sup> See Hanson 1998, 150

<sup>61</sup> For these new, non-phalanx roles, see Hanson 1996; 2001, 14-15; Rawlings 2000, 234-7.

<sup>62</sup> E.g. Pseudo-Xenophon 2.4; Thoukydides 2.17.4, 2.23.2, 2.25.3, 2.26, 2.32, 2.56, 2.58.1.

<sup>63</sup> Ober 1996, 62; van Wees 2000, 97.

<sup>64</sup> The fullest account of the last stage of this war is Kagan 1987.

<sup>65</sup> See Hanson 1998, 153-73.

<sup>66</sup> Quotation from Mitchell 1996, 101.

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<sup>67</sup> Demosthenes 60.8; Lysias 2.7-10; Plato *Menexenos* 239b; cf. Herodotos 9.27.

<sup>68</sup> For these functions of the mythical exploits, see Pritchard 1996, 146; 2000a, 21.

<sup>69</sup> See Ridley 1979, 522-6 and especially Lonis 1979, 17-19, 20-1 with ancient testimonia *pace* Cornell 2002, 45-6.

<sup>70</sup> A point well-recognized by Ober (1998, 78).

<sup>71</sup> This percentage is based on this hoplite figure of Thoukydides which excludes ‘the oldest and the youngest’ (2.13.6-7), who were not normally called up for active service and the demographic study of classical Athens by Mogens Hansen that remains valid and unchallenged (see Pritchard 2004). These two reserve groups were most probably aged between 50 and 59 years and 18 and 19 years respectively (Hansen 1988, 23 n.12 with primary sources). Independently of Thoukydides, Hansen makes a case that there were around 60,000 adult citizens living in Attike in 431 (1988, 14-28; 1991, 55). According to the model life he selects (1988, 21 n.9), 20 to 49 year olds are 72.7% of all males aged 18 to 80+ years, meaning that there were 43,620 Athenians in this age band in 431. Thus the 13,000 active hoplites represented only 29.8% of this age group.

<sup>72</sup> A position explicitly defended by de Sainte Croix 2004, 5-71; Whitehead 1981.

<sup>73</sup> For these two findings, see respectively Rosivach 2002 (cf. van Wees 2004, 268) on one hand and Foxhall 1997, 129-31 and Raaflaub 1999, 138, 150-1 n.49 on the other.

<sup>74</sup> See Connor 1988, 10, 10-1 n.30; Garlan 1995, 65; Ridley 1979, 520-1.

<sup>75</sup> E.g. Euripides *Herakles* 159-64; Lysias 16.13; Plato *Symposium* 221a. For the popular evaluation of the relative danger of these different types of soldiers, see Pritchard 2000a, 108-15. For the average casualty rates for victorious and defeated hoplite armies, see Krentz 1985 with Ober 1996, 61 n.13.

<sup>76</sup> For the city’s regular building of ships throughout the century and its investment in dockyards, see Blackman 1969; Raaflaub 1998a. Sub-hoplite citizens were not the only beneficiaries of public investment in the capital of warfare: between c.445 and 438 the city introduced financial support for individual citizens to purchase and feed a war horse, which saw the participation of elite Athens in the cavalry corps rise from 300 to 1000 (Andokides 3.6-7; Aristophanes *Knights* 225, 550; Thoukydides 2.13.7). See Bugh 1988, 39-78; Spence 1993, 9-17, 191-8. Around the same time the city also created an archery corps of 1600 archers (Andokides 3.7; Thoukydides 2.13.8), who were citizens and metics of sub-hoplite status (e.g. *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 138.1-4). See Plassart 1913; cf. Tölle-Katenbein 1980. While the elite members of the expanded cavalry corps were organized in tribal units, no other section of the armed forces created after 508/7, including the navy, fought or mustered according to tribes (see Pritchard 1995 and 2000b, 112-14 *pace* Jones 1987, 53-7).

<sup>77</sup> E.g. Aristophanes *Akharnians* 545-54; Thoukydides 6.31.3; cf. Demosthenes 50.7, 14-16. For the make-up of the trireme crew, see Morrison and Coates 1986, 107-27. For the recruiting and mobilizing of the 170 rowers and 30 hoplite marines and naval specialists of a trireme, see Gabrielsen 1994, 105-10; Pritchard 1995; 2000b, 112-14.

<sup>78</sup> See Pritchard 2000a, 116 with primary sources.

<sup>79</sup> For a thorough study of the background of the sailors in the Athenian fleet, see Amit 1962; cf. 1965. For an important consideration of what types of Athenians manned the ‘summer’ fleets of the later fifth century, see Rosivach 1985. The regular employment of slave rowers in the Athenian and other Greek navies in the classical period has been put beyond doubt by Hunt 1998, 83-101.

<sup>80</sup> Amit writes (1962, 177): ‘To sum up, we may say that there were sailors of various origin in Athenian ships, among them foreign mercenaries and slaves, but the core of the crews and the basis of the existence of the fleet were permanent residents of Athens, citizens and metics.’

<sup>81</sup> See Pritchard 1994, 124; Pritchett 1971, 3-29; van Wees 2004, 237, 316 n.27 with ancient testimonia.

<sup>82</sup> Logistics alone required sailors to be paid: since there was no cargo space on a trireme for the crew’s provisions to be stored, Athenian sailors usually had to purchase food from markets and

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private houses in coastal cities (Figueira 1998, 261-3; Jordan 1975, 109-10). For the introduction of public pay for political participation, see Jones 1957, 5; Phillips 1981, 30-1, 45 table 3; Podes 1994.

<sup>83</sup> For economic benefits of the empire for every social class of Athenians, see Finley 1978; Garland 1995, 93; Raaflaub 1994, 132-4.

<sup>84</sup> E.g. Aiskhylos *Seven against Thebes* 10-20; cf. 415-16; Euripides *Children of Herakles* 824-7; Thoukydides 1.144.4, 2.41.5, 2.43.1. See Pritchard 2000a, 80-4.

<sup>85</sup> For these laws, see Balot 2004, 419; Hamel 1998b; Pritchard 2000a, 84-6 – all with primary sources.

<sup>86</sup> See Hansen 1988, 14-28.

<sup>87</sup> Quotation from Raaflaub 1994, 138. To his credit Kurt Raaflaub is the only ancient historian to have explored the mass psychology behind Athenian imperialism in detail (see 1994; 1996; cf. 1998b; 1998c). Hanson makes some good generalizations about the influence of democracy on military efficiency and innovation in classical Athens but does not explain the mechanisms of these posited connections (2001, 17-26).

<sup>88</sup> See Ober 1989, 104-26.

<sup>89</sup> See Pritchard 1998a, 40; 2000a, 5-6 with references.

<sup>90</sup> See Pritchard 1998a, 41-2; 2000a, 7-10.

<sup>91</sup> For this influence of the audience, see, for example, [Andokides] 4.20-1; Aristophanes *Birds* 444-7; *Frogs* 771-80; Plato *Laws* 659a-c, 700a-1b. For their range of responses, including hissing, shouting, booing and clapping, see Csapo and Slater 1997, 301-5; Wallace 1997, 98-106 with references.

<sup>92</sup> Csapo and Slater 1995, 157-8.

<sup>93</sup> Boedeker and Raaflaub 1998, 322. Burian writes (1997, 206): ‘...as the vehicle of an important competition and as a form of popular entertainment, tragedy had to meet a constant demand for novelty.’ For the constant generic innovations of comic poets, see Bremer 1993, 160-5; Pritchard 2000a, 50. For the demands of novelty faced by the satyr-play, see Seaford 1984, 44. Zimmermann argues that transformation of dithyramb in Athens of the second half of the fifth century was largely due to the competitive nature of its performance (1996, 53-4).

<sup>94</sup> Raaflaub 2001, 319; Hansen 1991, 133.

<sup>95</sup> Quotation from Raaflaub 1994, 138.

<sup>96</sup> For this lower class suspicion of political leaders, see Brock 1991, 160-2; Pritchard 2000a, 6, 65-7; Ober 1989, 165-74 – all with ancient testimonia. For the scathing criticism of military leaders in Aristophanes, see Okál 1960, 109-16.

<sup>97</sup> See Hanson 2001, 20-1.

<sup>98</sup> See Pritchard 2000a, 212-3.

<sup>99</sup> Amongst other things they have been called ‘civic ideology’ (e.g. Goldhill 1986, 57, 70), ‘Athenian identity and civic ideology’ (Boegehold and Scafuro 1994), ‘the Athenian imaginary’ (Loraux 1986) and ‘a civic ideology...defined by public discourse’ (Ober 1994, 102) or in ‘public conversations’ (e.g. Balot 2004, 406). See generally Pritchard 1998a, 38-9; 2000a, 2-3.

<sup>100</sup> E.g. Pritchard 2000a, 6; 2003, 308.

<sup>101</sup> The classic studies of this appropriation are Loraux 1975; 1982.

<sup>102</sup> This form of the funeral and burial of the war dead and the funeral oration itself date to the second quarter of the fifth century (see Loraux 1986, 56-57; Parker 1996, 132-5; Pritchett 1985, 100-24). Nonetheless this democratization of the epic ideology of war begins right back in 506 with the burial of those killed fighting Khalkis (see Anderson 2003, 151-5; Pritchard 2005). My description of the funeral owes much to Loraux 1986, 15-42; cf. Low 2002; Pritchard 1996, 137-8; 2000a, 224-33. For the commemoration of the war dead of other cities in fifth-century Greece, see Low 2003.

<sup>103</sup> See Loraux 1986, 349 n.26.

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<sup>104</sup> See Stupperich 1994, 94, 101 nn.24-6 with references. For the contemporary meaning of such sculpture, see Pritchard 2000a, 91, 91 n.71 with ancient testimonia. For the lion as a symbol of *aretē* in Homer, see above.

<sup>105</sup> Elsewhere I argue that sub-hoplite citizens were included on these lists (Pritchard 2000a, 234-40), despite recently expressed doubts about this (see, for example, Hanson 1996, 306; Raaflaub 1994, 141-2; 1996, 156; Strauss 1996, 313, 320-1; 2000).

<sup>106</sup> For the general characteristics of this speech, see Pritchard 1996, 5; 2000a, 13-26.

<sup>107</sup> See Pritchard 1998a, 44-53; 1998b; 2000a, 76-161.

<sup>108</sup> See Pritchard 1998a, 53-6; 2000a, 163-243.

<sup>109</sup> For their decidedly mixed view of poverty, see Dover 1974, 109-12; Pritchard 2000a, 61-3; Rosivach 1991 – all with ancient testimonia.

<sup>110</sup> E.g. Aristophanes *Wealth* 565; *Assembly Women* 565-67, 667-8; Lysias 31.11.

<sup>111</sup> E.g. Aristophanes *Birds* 592; *Wealth* 133-4; *Thesmophoriazousai* 289-90; *Wasps* 708-11.

<sup>112</sup> E.g. Aiskhines 1.11; Aristophanes *Akharnians* 595-7; Euripides *Suppliant Women* 886-7; Sophokles *Ajax* 410; cf. Aristophanes *Knights* 943-4.